



Approved For Release 2004/02/02 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300110004-7
TOP SECRET
TS790359

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

J3M- 133679
25 JUN 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Attention: Director, Program Assessment Office, Resource Management Staff

Subject: Intelligence Support to Strategic Forces (U)

1. (U) A review of your draft for comment report on "Intelligence Support to Strategic Forces" has been conducted.
2. (TS) The reader is left with the general impression that improved intelligence will do little to improve employment of strategic forces. This impression is not supported by the actual process utilized to upgrade and update the effectiveness of strategic forces. The Joint Staff revises annually the detailed guidance to the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) for preparation of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) based on the latest intelligence estimates. The JSTPS then prepares a major revision to the SIOP annually based in part on the latest intelligence. Additionally, modifications to the SIOP are made frequently if intelligence reports indicate a need. Therefore, improved intelligence data does in fact improve effectiveness of strategic forces.
3. (TS) The SIOP should not be considered an immutable plan. The SIOP is structured from guidance which attempts to account for all conditions of war initiation. There are, however, enough uncertainties about how nuclear war might start that

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procedures must be flexible enough to accommodate modified policy or even new policy which may result from the nature of an evolving crisis. To this end, there has been developed a Direct to Forces retargeting concept which will place heavy demands on the intelligence collection, analysis, and distribution processes. Additionally, JSTPS recently developed a list of TDI categories which, if near-real-time reconnaissance/intelligence support were available, would permit efficient SIOP retargeting in the immediate pre-execution period.

4. (TS) If the analysis is to lay the basis for DCI decisions on the NFIP program for FY 81 and beyond, the balance of the report is reversed. The inevitability of changes in guidance in the near future is underemphasized. Present guidance was formulated, in part, with an appreciation for the limitations in available intelligence. The Nuclear Targeting Policy Review recommendations correctly identify the need to improve our understanding of how the Soviets might start, fight, terminate, and recover from nuclear war in order to optimize nuclear weapons employment policy. The improved understanding can only be achieved by increased intelligence support. This planning should begin immediately.

5. (TS) Intelligence support in the Post-execution period is underemphasized. With policy emphasis on escalation control, building blocks, and limited nuclear exchanges, real time intelligence collection and reporting after an execution is critical. The smaller the exchange the more time sensitive the information. Every effort should be made now to limit the time necessary for intelligence systems to react following a nuclear exchange.

Philip D. Shutler
PHILIP D. SHUTLER
Lieutenant General, USMC
Director for Operations

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
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